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WALL STREET JOURNAL
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Thursday, August 21, 1980

NEW YORK TIMES
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WASHINGTON STAR 21 AUGUST 1980 Pg. 5

Brown Outlines New U.S. Policy on Nuclear Strategy

By John J. Fialka
Washington Star Staff Writer

Asserting there is evidence Soviet leaders are considering the possibility of a "prolonged" nuclear exchange in a war with the West, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown described yesterday a "refinement" in U.S. strategic policy that would focus it more closely on the possible moves during such a war.

In a speech at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., Brown said that "we are necessarily giving greater attention to how a nuclear war would actually be fought by both sides if deterrence fails."

Brown hastened to add that the policy changes contained in Presidential Directive 59, recently signed by President Carter, are not intended to give the United States a first strike capability to start a nuclear war.

Rather, he said, the changes — which were not detailed — are designed to convince the Soviets that "no war and no course of aggression by them that led to the use of nuclear weapons — on any scale of attack and at any stage of conflict — could lead to victory, however they (the Soviets) may define victory."

In the first public accounting of the changes embodied in the presidential directive, Brown said U.S. strategies must be tailored to allow the United States to use nuclear weaponry more "selectively."

Such a change, he said, would warn the Soviets that an exchange at any level of escalation would cripple "the things the Soviet leaders appear to value most," things Brown defined as military and civilian command and control structures, military targets and industrial targets needed to support a war effort.

As Brown described the new policy, it is the old U.S. nuclear policy — deterrence — redesigned to make it more effective against the enhanced Soviet nuclear capability now being put into place.

Brown called it "a natural evolution" of U.S. strategic policies dating back to the early 1960s. "It emphasizes the survivability of our forces and it conveys to the Soviets

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U.S. Testing New Jets 'Invisible' to Detection

Star Wire Services

The United States for two years has been secretly flying piloted and unmanned tactical aircraft that are virtually "invisible" to air defense radar, infrared, electronic or acoustical detection, Armed Forces Journal reported yesterday.

The magazine said four or five types of the "stealth" aircraft, all new designs, have been flown as test models or prototypes, and a strategic bomber version is on the drawing boards.

In its September edition, the monthly Quoted defense officials as saying the new techniques used to shield the aircraft from detection "pretty much invalidate the whole set of air defense systems existing today."

Pentagon officials said at least one of the fighter plane types has been tested in secret at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada. The plane has an unusual shape and is constructed with special, radar-resistant material.

Other officials, however, expressed skepticism over the potential of this one type, developed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corp. They said that all three test planes have crashed as a result of their peculiar shape.

The planes' resistance to radar is said to stem, in part, from its shape. Extensive studies, according to officials, have shown that various parts of aircraft, such as engine inlets, can be designed to eliminate the sharp corners that produce maximum radar reflections.

But they said the most important key to reducing radar visibility has been the development of special materials applied to the metal skin of the aircraft. Radar waves, accord-

(See JETS, Pg. 4)

BALTIMORE SUN

21 AUGUST 1980 Pg. 8

Defense chief explains shift in war strategy

By Charles W. Corddry
Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—America's newly broadened nuclear strategy was dictated by the Soviet Union's strategic arms buildup and its possible belief that it could win a nuclear war, Defense Secretary Harold Brown said yesterday.

The strategy, which has brought outcries from Moscow about an arms race and quest for superiority, will reduce rather than increase the danger of nuclear war, Mr. Brown said in a speech at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I.

He declared his judgment that there is no such thing as a winnable nuclear war and said the aim of United States strategy policy must be to persuade the Soviet leadership of that fact.

Therefore, the United States must go on modernizing its strategic forces with the MX missile, new Trident submarines and the missiles they carry, and possibly—though later on—new bombers.

Under the broadened strategy, recently formalized in a document called Presidential Directive No. 59, operational plans for these forces are being further revised to include a much more extensive list of Soviet targets for retaliation in event of either a limited or general Soviet nuclear attack.

In justifying the administration's priority emphasis on the mobile, concealable MX missile, Mr. Brown revealed a new intelligence assessment that Minuteman and Titan intercontinental missiles now are theoretically vulnerable to a Soviet strike.

In January, the defense chief had put the vulnerability period in 1981 or 1982. Yesterday he said the "potential [threat] has been realized, or close to it." Another defense official conceded "this is happening sooner than we thought."

Answering critics of both the MX and the nuclear tar-

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THURSDAY MORNING, 21 AUGUST 1980

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Partial Text of Defense Secretary's Speech at U.S. Navy War College

A Policy Intended To Discourage Russia

Following is a partial text of a speech today by Defense Secretary Harold Brown to the Navy War College graduating class in Newport, R.I.

... The overriding objective of our strategic forces is to deter nuclear war. Deterrence requires stability. To achieve strategic nuclear stability, three requirements must be met.

First, we must have strategic nuclear forces that can absorb a Soviet first strike and still retaliate with devastating effects.

Second, we must meet our security requirements and maintain an overall strategic balance at the lowest and most stable levels made possible by our own force planning and by arms control agreements.

Third, we must have a doctrine and plans for the use of our forces if they are needed that make clear to the Soviets the hard reality that, by any course leading to nuclear war, they could never gain an advantage that would outweigh the unacceptable price they would have to pay.

The ability of our forces to survive a surprise attack is the essence of deterrence. ... But in the future, Soviet military programs could, at least potentially, threaten the survivability of each component of our strategic forces. ... We are responding to these current and future threats by appropriately strengthening our strategic nuclear capabilities across the boards.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to consider the limitations imposed in the SALT II Treaty to be in our national security interest.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan made it necessary, in practical political terms, to defer SALT II ratification while we assessed the Soviet action and implemented the necessary responses. But ratification of the treaty at the earliest feasible time is still important to our national security interest. ...

President Carter has recently issued an implementing directive — Presidential Directive No. 59 —

codifying our restated doctrine, and giving guidance for further evolution in our planning and systems acquisition.

Obviously, the details of our planning must remain a closely guarded secret. Nonetheless, the basic premises of our policy can be stated publicly without compromise to our security. In fact, it is very much in our national interest that our deterrence policy — and the consequences of aggression — are clearly understood by friend and adversary alike.

... P.D. 59 is not a new strategic doctrine; it is not a radical departure from U.S. strategic policy over the past decade or so. It is, in fact, a refinement, a codification of previous statements of our strategic policy. ...

In our analysis and planning, we are necessarily giving greater attention to how a nuclear war would actually be fought by both sides if deterrence fails. ...

By definition, successful deterrence means, among other things, shaping Soviet views of what a war would mean — of what risks and losses aggression would entail. We must have forces, contingency plans, and command and control capabilities that will convince the Soviet leadership that no war and no course of aggression by them that led to use of nuclear weapons — on any scale of attack and at any stage of conflict — could lead to victory, however they may define victory. Firmly convincing them of that fundamental truth is the surest restraint against their being tempted to aggression.

Operationally, our countervailing strategy requires that our plans and capabilities be structured to put more stress on being able to employ strategic nuclear forces selectively, as well as by all-out retaliation in response to massive attacks on the United States. It is our policy — and we have increasingly the means and detailed plans to carry out this policy — to ensure that the Soviet leadership knows that if they chose some intermediate level of aggression, we could, by selective, large (but still less than maximum) nuclear attacks, exact an unacceptably high price in the things the Soviet leaders appear to value most — po-

litical and military control, military force both nuclear and conventional, and the industrial capability to sustain a war. ...

... The fundamental premises of our countervailing strategy are a natural evolution of the conceptual foundations built over the course of a generation, by, for example, Secretaries McNamara and Schlesinger, to name only two of my predecessors who have been most identified with development of our nuclear doctrine. ... leadership and military control. ...

This evolution in our doctrine enhances deterrence, and reduces the likelihood of nuclear war. It does so because — like our nuclear modernization programs — it emphasizes the survivability of our forces and it conveys to the Soviets that any or all of the components of Soviet power can be struck in retaliation, not only their urban-industrial complex.

... The Soviet leadership appears to contemplate at least the possibility of a relatively prolonged exchange if a war comes, and in some circles at least, they seem to take seriously the theoretical possibility of victory in such a war. We cannot afford to ignore these views — even if we think differently, as I do. We need to have, and we do have, a posture — both forces and doctrine — that makes it clear to the Soviets, and to the world, that any notion of victory in nuclear war is unrealistic. ...

This is not a first strike strategy. We are talking about what we could and (depending on the nature of a Soviet attack) would do in response to a Soviet attack. Nothing in the policy contemplates that nuclear war can be a deliberate instrument of achieving our national security goals, because it cannot be. But we cannot afford the risk that the Soviet leadership might entertain this illusion that nuclear war could be an option — or its threat a means of coercion — for them.

In declaring our ability and our intention to prevent Soviet victory, even in the most dangerous circumstances, we have no illusions about what a nuclear war would mean for mankind. It would be an unimaginable catastrophe. ...

ceive from the United States."

For the 1981 fiscal year beginning Oct. 1 the United States is programming \$1.2 billion for Israeli military aid and \$785 million for economic support.

Evron said Christopher had not brought up the question of whether U.S.-made weapons were used by Israel in its commando raid yesterday against Palestinian guerrilla bases in southern Lebanon.

Asked about this, Evron said that "we did not get the weapons in order not to use them" and that the raid was part of Israel's self-defense.

WASHINGTON STAR 20 AUGUST 1980 (21) Pg. 12

Israel Requests \$2.9 Billion in Aid for 1982

Israel asked the United States today for \$2.9 billion in military and economic aid for the 1982 fiscal year that begins in 13 months. The amount is about \$1 billion more than Israel is now receiving.

Ambassador Ephraim Evron

delivered to acting Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher the request for \$1.8 billion in military aid and \$1.1 billion of economic and civilian aid.

Evron told reporters that Israel tried to be realistic in making its request. But Jerusalem Radio said Sunday that there had been differences of opinion within the Israeli government over how much money to ask.

Some Israeli officials, the broadcast said, had favored asking for only \$1.9 billion "on the assumption that this is the amount we will re-